This paper examines the long-term effect of historical financial institutions on the development of informal finance in contemporary China. By using data on 137 counties in north China, our analysis finds that the density of local financial institutions (qianzhuang and diandang) in the late Qing period (circa 1911) has a positive effect on the number and total assets of Small Loan Companies, a dominant institution of informal finance today. This finding is robust to the inclusion of a variety of confounding variables and instru-menting historical financial institutions using the frequency of crop failures in the Qing period. We also find that the persistent effect of historical financial institutions can be explained by Confucian culture, which instills integrity, lineage solidarity and acquaint-ance networks.
Introduction
In the past few decades China has recorded sustained growth of informal finance. Informal finance refers to financial activities that operate outside the state banking system, which aim to provide microcredits and financial services to small businesses that have difficulty accessing (formal) banking services. Given China's underdeveloped capital market, informal finance has played an important role in sustaining private enterprise growth (Allen, Qian and Qian, 2005) . Having recognised the importance of informal finance, China's state authorities have started to liberalise the informal financial market to encourage the development of micro-credits. A variety of informal financial institutions, in particular Small Loan Companies (xiao'e daikuan gongsi), rotating savings and credit associations (hehui or ROSCA), pawns, and even (illegal) underground banks (dixia qianzhuang), emerged and expanded rapidly. Using Small Loan Companies, a dominant form of informal financial institutions, as an example, the annual growth rate amounts to 45.8% in total number and 64.8% in total loans between 2008 and 2014. As a whole, the annual growth rate in total loans of the entire informal finance sector was allegedly about 17. 8% between 1978 8% between and 2008 8% between (Li, 2010 .
The phenomenal rise of informal finance in China has received growing attention among scholars and policy makers (e.g., Allen, Qian and Qian, 2005; Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2010; Qian and Weng, 2009; Tsai, 2002; Yao, 2009; Zhang, Xu and Qin, 2013) . In explaining the rise of informal finance, however, most studies focus on contemporary institutional and social-economic determinants. 1 In this paper we attempt to examine the same question from a historical perspective.
Specifically, we examine whether the development of informal finance in China is still (positively) affected by historical financial development, particularly the late Qing period when the Chinese native financial institutions (qianzhuang and diandang) reached their heyday.
By shaping people's beliefs and preferences, historical institutions may have bred cultures that tend to endure through the ages (e.g., Alesina and Giuliano, 2015; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Voigtländer 1 In terms of the determinants of informal finance in contemporary China, existing studies mainly focus on the role of economic development (Zhang, Xu and Qin, 2013) , the development of formal financial sector (Ngalawa and Viegi, 2013; Yao, 2009) , policy of local governments (Zhang, 1997) , and social capital (Qian and Weng, 2009). and Voth, 2012) . It is through the cultural channel that historical institutions affect economic or financial development in the long run (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Becker, Boeckh, Hainz and Woessmann, 2016; Grosjean, 2011; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998) . A thesis central to our study is that, although these historical financial institutions vanished for nearly a century, the culture they embodied, in particular the (Confucian) norms of integrity, lineage solidarity, and acquaintance network, which could help enforce the credit relationship in traditional
Chinese society, may survive to this day. In light of the fact that informal financial activities in China operate in an environment without clear legal protection, they may still rely on the traditional business culture to sustain their growth.
Anecdotes suggest that the business model of historical finance has manifested in contemporary informal finance. Today's hehui, or ROSCA, for instance, can find its historical prototype in the Song dynasty (960-1279) (Wang, 1935) . In the same vein, many informal financial institutions not only still use the names of their historical counterparts (eg qianzhuang, biaohui, hehui, diandang) , their lending is still based on the lineage or community network. Observed at the regional level, in provinces that were historically prosperous in finance (e.g., Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangsu and Shandong), informal To account for the persistent effect of historical finance on the development of informal finance today, we choose the 137 counties of Shandong Province as our sample regions. Shandong not only had a prosperous native financial market in historical China, but also had a fast-growing informal financial sector in the past few decades. More importantly, a unique advantage of Shandong is that, as the birthplace of Confucius, Shandong was deeply influenced by Confucian culture, which provides us with a suitable setting for examining the effect of Confucian norms in sustaining the long-term persistence of historical finance.
We draw upon the variation in the number of native financial institutions (qianzhuang and diandang) in each county of Shandong (normalised by population) in the late Qing dynasty (1911) as our key independent variable. Similar to their modern counterparts, these historical financial institutions operated deposit, loans and other professional services and played an important role in facilitating industrial development and economic modernisation after China was forced to open in 1840s (Zhang, 2007) . To measure the development of contemporary informal finance, we use the number or total assets of Small Loan Companies at the county level between 2009 and 2013. To deal with the change in county administrative boundaries between the late Qing period and today, we match the boundaries using the China Historical Geographic Information System (CHGIS).
To avoid the possibility that the relationship between historical financial institutions and today's informal finance may be spurious, we first include a vector of confounding variables that may be correlated with historical finance and informal finance today. These include historical economic prosperity (proxied by urbanisation rate and population density in 1920s), Western influence (treaty ports) and various contemporary correlates of informal finance, including GDP per capita, share of private employments, industrial structure, dominance of formal finance, ratio of fiscal revenue to expenditure and geographical factors (terrain ruggedness, distance to coast).
To deal with the concern that there may still be some unobserved factors which are simultaneously correlated with historical finance and contemporary informal finance, we employ the frequency of crop failures in the Qing dynasty as the instrument of the number of historical financial institutions. This is premised on the reasoning that, given Qing China (Shandong), a rain-fed agricultural culture, weather shocks and the resulted crop failures represented a primarily survival risk in peasant communities. As a result, an important function of financial institutions at the time was to mitigate the survival risk by providing loans to peasants (Lu, 2000) . We therefore expect a positive relationship between the frequency of crop failures and the density of financial institutions in the Qing time. Given that crop failures were a natural (exogenous) event, it is unlikely to affect the development of informal finance today, other than through the channel of historical financial institutions.
Our empirical analysis shows that the number (and total assets) of Small Loan Companies in contemporary China is positively affected by the number of historical financial institutions. This result is robust to the inclusion of other confounding variables and across different estimations. In terms of magnitudes, our instrumented results suggest that a 1% increase in the number of financial institutions (per 10,000 people) in the late Qing period increases 0.096% of the number (and 0.158% of total assets) of Small Loan Companies (per 10,000 people) in 2013.
To examine whether Confucian culture is a channel through which historical financial institutions affect today's informal finance, we use the number of Confucian temples in each county in the Qing dynasty as the proxy for the strength of Confucianism. In Qing China, the erection of Confucian temples and the associated rituals represented an important means of promoting Confucianism (Yang, 1961) . Stronger Confucian norms would not only give rise to more Confucian temples being built, but would be further deepened by the temples in turn (Ho, 1962) . By examining the interaction term between the number of Confucian temples and historical financial institutions, we find that the persistent effect of historical financial institutions on today's Small Loan Companies becomes significantly greater in counties that had more Confucian temples, suggesting Confucian culture is likely to sustain the long-term persistence of historical finance.
Our study contributes to two corpus of literature. The first pertains to the determinants of the development of informal finance (e.g., Ahlin, Lin and Maio, 2011; Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2010; Bogan, 2012; Kaboski and Townsend, 2005; Tsai, 2002) . While most studies focus on contemporary institutional and social-economic determinants, our unique contribution is to incorporate historical and cultural factors into analysis. This suggests that today's informal financial activities would likely still be shaped by the local historical financial institutions with strong cultural norms embedded.
By providing fresh evidence to the persistence of financial activities in the context of China, our study is also closely related to the literature on the long-term persistence of historical institutions and its cultural channel (e.g., Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Alesina and Giuliano, 2015; Becker, Boeckh, Hainz and Woessmann, 2016; Grosjean, 2011; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Voigtländer and Voth, 2012, among others) . Particularly, our study coincides with that of Grosjean (2011) the Shanxi merchants had opened 51 head offices and more than 600 branches across all Chinese provinces by the early 20 th century (Huang, 2002) . The third is diandang, or pawnshop. As the oldest financial organisation in China, pawnshops lent cash and collected interest from borrowers who provided collateral. By the same token, the commercialisation in the late Qing period contributed substantially to the prosperity of pawnshops, whose number allegedly reached at least 23,000 by the early 19 th century (Luo, 1978) . After the reform and opening up in the early 1980s, the private economy's revival generated a growing demand for private financing. Having recognised this, the government began to allow private finance to "moderately" develop. have also developed rapidly since the late 1980s; as of 2014, there were 7,574 pawnshops in China.
However, contemporary informal finance mostly operates in the "gray area" of the legal system. There are almost no clear legal recognitions that protect and regulate private financial activities.
The Persistence of Historical Finance
Although China's historical financial organisations disappeared in the early 20 th century, their longterm historical accumulation in business models and culture may continue to affect the development of contemporary informal finance, especially in an environment where the formal (legal) protection on informal finance is weak. This is true in the context of China, a culture that has long been associated with historical financial activities pertaining to Confucian norms, in particular morality, integrity, trust and kinship solidarity (Peng, Chen and Yuan, 2008) . On the one hand, by restricting economic transactions with a small network of acquaintances and emphasising clan obligation, Confucianism substantially mitigates private lending transaction costs. However, it can also help enforce financial contracts (Chen, 2007) .
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In light of the fact that the legal protection on business was weak in the Ming-Qing period, 6 the operation of traditional finance often relied on the cultural arrangements of Confucianism. 7 A notable example is the operation of qianzhuang, which clearly indicated in the slogan of the storefront that the deposit and loan businesses must follow the principle of "integrity and righteousness", which means that the guarantee depends on moral promise rather than material. Accordingly, the loan business of qianzhuang was mainly the unsecured, credit loan (Chen, 1997) . Similarly, piaohao also insisted of "righteousness over profits" (xian yi hou li) and "from righteousness to profits" (yi yi zhi li) as their business philosophy. They only provided services to respected, credible people (Huang, 2002) .
Given the slow-moving nature of cultural evolution, culture is likely to remain broadly stable and transmit from one generation to the next (e.g., Bisin and Verdier, 2000; Richerson and Boyd, 2008). 8 This is arguably the case for Confucianism, which has accumulated for millennia as Chinese orthodoxy. Although historical financial institutions have long vanished, the business models based on Confucian norms may continue to this day. For example, Confucian lineage, or the relationship capital (guanxi) in general, played a key role in financing the rural industrialisation in the early period of the reform (Peng, 2004) . In terms of various private lending activities, they still rely on a network of acquaintances to obtain information about money demanders (Lin and Sun, 2005) , and use reputation, integrity and social networks to enforce their contracts (Zhuo, 2006) . Even Small Loan
Companies employ a variety of "relational capital" in selecting their loan targets, assessing default risks and supervising loan use (Zhou and Li, 2013) . According to our survey on the 134 Small Loan
Companies in Shandong Province in 2014, 9 54% obtained borrowers' information by consulting their relatives, whereas the loans from the acquaintances accounted for up to 63% of total loans.
Data
To examine the persistent effect of historical financial institutions on contemporary informal finance, we chose the 137 counties of Shandong Province as our sample regions. As a representative province in north China, Shandong had a prosperous native financial market in the Qing dynasty. Historical Controls. Historical correlates of financial development in the Qing dynasty may also have a long-term effect on contemporary informal finance. The first and foremost is economic prosperity.
Following Bairoch (1988) , we use the population density and urbanisation rate of the 1920s to proxy for local economic prosperity at the time, reasoning that these two measures were positively correlated with the levels of agricultural output and commercialisation (Skinner, 1977) . The data are obtained from Stauffer (1922) .
A related factor is treaty ports that opened in the late Qing period. By generating financial demand from overseas trade, treaty ports fostered the growth of Chinese native banks in late Qing time (Zhang, 1989) . Moreover, regions of treaty ports still perform better than other regions in terms of economic development today (Jia, 2014) . Therefore we control for a dummy indicating whether a county was ever a treaty port.
In addition, religions also play an important role in shaping financial activities (Kumar, Page and Spalt, 2011; Stulz and Williamson, 2003) . In China's context, the Buddhist temples were actively involved in the lending business from the 7 th century onwards. Similarly, the Taoist temples also have the function of financing in rural communities. To account for their possible effects we control for the number of Contemporary Controls. We also control for a rich set of contemporary covariates of informal finance.
The first and foremost are regional economic conditions and formal financial development, which are considered primary determinants of informal financial activities (Ahlin, Lin and Maio, 2011; Hermes, Lensink and Meesters, 2009 Last, but not least, we also control for the ratio of fiscal revenue to expenditure, the share of the added value of the second and third industries to GDP, a dummy indicating whether a county is in the Shandong-specific "blue-yellow region" in which the provincial government distinctly supports the informal finance, and two geographic indictors (terrain ruggedness and distance to coast). Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics and data sources for all the variables.
Empirical Results
To examine whether the number of financial institutions in the late Qing period has an effect on the development of Small Loan Companies today, we employ the following specification:
where y i refers to our dependent variable measured by the number (or total assets) of Small Loan The baseline results are reported in Table 2 . We use the number of Small Loan Companies as the dependent variable in columns 1-3, and alternatively use total assets in columns 3-6. In both cases, we first exclude all the additional control variables before fully including them. The results show that financial institutions of late Qing have a significantly positive effect on the number and total assets of today's Small Loan Companies. These results are robust to the inclusion of other confounding variables and across different specifications. In terms of magnitude, taking columns 2 and 5 for examples, a 1% increase in the number of historical financial institutions increases the number (or total assets) of small companies by 0.026% (or 0.04%).
Instrumented Evidences
Although we have controlled for a gamut of confounding variables, some unobserved factors, such as the quality of local governance, human capital and tradition, may be simultaneously correlated with historical financial institutions and contemporary informal finance. Another concern is measurement error. Although qianzhuang and diandang were dominant native financial institutions in Shandong Province during the Qing dynasty, other financial organisations, such as trade unions and various private lending activities, were unobserved. The omitted variables and measurement errors would bias our estimates in Table 2 .
To deal with these endogenous problems we employ the number of crop failures in the Qing dynasty as the instrument of the number of financial institutions. Our justifications are as follows. First, an important function of the native financial institutions (qianzhuang and diandang) in the Qing period was to mitigate economic hardship caused by crop failures. This is especially the case of Shandong, a predominantly rain-fed agricultural province on the north China plain. 13 Specifically, due to the frequent droughts on the western plain and the floods from the levee breach of the Yellow River, 13 Until the 1920s the share of agricultural population in Shandong was still above 95% (Sun, 1957) .
Shandong was frequently struck by natural calamities. 14 This resulted in endemic crop failures and famines.
The frequent crop failures gave rise to a strong demand for borrowing to circumvent the survival risk.
According to the records in the Shandong tongzhi (Provincial Gazetteer of Shandong), during famine peasants usually pledged their farm tools or cloth to the pawnshops and, to meet an urgent need, they even went to loan sharks. 15 As a result, in areas that were subject to the vicissitudes of the weathers, financial institutions prospered. According to a survey of Luo and Jing (1985) , it was not uncommon that landlords in Shandong operated loan businesses in the Qing time, which accounted for 86.3% of the 131 landlords surveyed in the 46 sample counties.
We therefore expect a positive relationship between the frequency of crop failure and the density of financial institutions in the Qing period. Thanks to the systematic records on famine reliefs by the Qing authorities, we enumerate the total number of crop failures in each county during the entire Qing period based on the Qing shilu (Veritable Records of the Qing Emperors). 16 The correlation coefficient between crop failures and financial institutions was 0.14 and significant at the 1% level. Given that crop failures at the time were mostly caused by natural calamities, our instrument is exogenously random and is unlikely to affect today's Small Loan Companies (other than through the channel of historical financial institutions).
The instrumented results are reported in Table 3 . We use the number of Small Loan Companies as the dependent variable in columns 1 and 2, and use the total assets in columns 3 and 4. In both cases we first use the 2SLS estimation, before using the IV-Tobit to address the over-zero problem in the dependent variables. In all regressions we control for the covariates and use the robust standard errors. The instrumented results importantly confirm that historical financial institutions have a significantly positive effect on today's number (or total assets) of Small Loan Companies. Moreover, the instrumented effect of historical financial institutions is greater than that of OLS (or Tobit) in Table 2 . Taking columns 1 and 3 of Table 3 for examples, a 1% increase in the number of historical financial institutions increases the number (or total assets) of small loan companies by 0.096% (or 0.158%).
While our instrumented results reinforce the validity of our OLS (or Tobit) estimates, they also suggest that the OLS (or Tobit) models might underestimate the long-term effect of historical finance.
Panel Data Results
Since Reported in Table 4 , the effect of historical finance on contemporary Small Loan Companies not only remains significantly positive, but becomes greater over time. This result is robust to whether or not including the other controls and using different estimations. This suggests that the persistent effect of historical finance might not be mitigated by the improvement in institutional environments.
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The Cultural Channel
To examine whether Confucian culture is a channel through which historical finance affects contemporary Small Loan Companies, we use the number of Confucian temples that a county had established in the Qing dynasty as the proxy for the strength of Confucianism. Confucian temples refer to the temples in which people perform sacrificial rites to worship the Confucian sages and exemplars. Based on the specific Confucians for honoring, the temples mainly include wenmiao (for honoring Confucius and other sages), minghuan xiangxian ci (for honoring the notable officials and local virtuous Confucians), and zhongxiao jieyi ci (for honoring the local loyal and filial men), among others (Yao, 2000) . The erection of Confucian temples represented an important means of promoting Confucianism in late imperial China (Yang, 1961; Ho, 1962) . Following Kung and Ma (2014), we assume that more Confucian temples would be built in counties with stronger Confucian norms, and this would further deepen the Confucian norms. The data on Confucian temples is obtained from
Shandong tongzhi (Provincial Gazetteer of Shandong).
We first examine whether the development of historical finance was positively affected by Confucian culture in the Qing period. Reported in Table 5 , we find that the number of Confucian temples has a significant positive effect on the number of historical financial institutions (qianzhuang and diandang).
These results remain robust when we control for several confounding variables of Confucianism and historical finance, and use OLS or Tobit estimations. The results suggest that the native financial institutions were more likely to develop in areas that had a strong Confucian culture. Stated differently, Confucian norms were closely associated with the operation of financial activities in historical China. Now we examine the possible role of Confucian culture in sustaining the long-term persistence of historical finance. Our empirical strategy is to introduce the interaction terms between the number of Confucian temples and the number of financial institutions in the Qing period, and examine their effects on the number of Small Loan Companies today, based on the following specification:
The results in Table 6 show that the interaction term between Confucian culture and historical financial institutions is significantly positive, which means that the effect of historical financial institutions on Small Loan Companies would become greater in counties having stronger Confucian culture. In contrast, the insignificant coefficient of historical financial institutions suggests that it has no (independent) effect on contemporary Small Loan Companies in counties where there is no Confucian temple.
For robustness, we employ county-level panel data (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) to examine the possible change in the effect of Confucian culture over time. Accordingly, we focus on the effect of the triple interactions among Confucian temples, historical financial institutions, and year dummies. Reported in Table 7 , the coefficient of the triple interaction terms remain significantly positive across all specifications, and even become greater over time. While these results reinforce our finding on the persistent effect of
Confucian culture (Table 6 ), they also suggest that the effect of Confucian culture in sustaining the long-term persistence of historical finance is not mitigated by the improvement in institutional environment, but may play a more important role over time.
Conclusion
Using the 137 counties of Shandong Province in China, our analyses indicate that the number and Table 2 . Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Table 2 . Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Table 2 . The sample is based on the 107 counties of Shandong in the Qing dynasty. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Table 2 . Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Table 2 . Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
